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ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS AND 





SECOND TIME FARCE 

ROBERT D. SNOOK* 
INTRODUCTION 
For over twenty years, the environmental citizen suit has had 
the potential to be, and has occasionally functioned as, an impor­
tant tool that empowers individual citizens to protect their local en­
vironment and assist in directing environmental policy through 
private enforcement actions. Unfortunately, in certain circum­
stances, the effectiveness of the citizen suit as a tool has been lim­
ited by a battery of procedural barriers raised by polluters and 
others. Some of these barriers are found in the text of statutes and 
others derive from federal common law.1 The defendants raising 
these barriers include the usual list of suspects, such as industrial 
manufacturers and real estate developers, but also include local 
governments.2 It is self-evident that industry defendants oppose 
citizen suits as a cost matter. However, it is interesting that govern­
ment regulators sometimes side with defendants in citizen suit 
* Assistant Attorney General for the State of Connecticut; J.D., Western New 
England College School of Law; M.S., University of Massachusetts; B.S., University of 
Massachusetts. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not nec­
essarily reflect those of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut. 
1. See, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) (text 
of statute bars citizen suit), superseded by 844 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1987), affd, 493 U.S. 
20 (1989). For various common law doctrines barring citizen suits, see the following 
cases: Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1193 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(abstention); Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124 
(2d Cir. 1991) (mootness); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 
918-20 (5th Cir. 1983) (primary jurisdiction); Orange Environment, Inc. v. County of 
Orange, 923 F. Supp. 529, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (mootness); Davies v. National Coop­
erative Refinery Ass'n, 43 ERC 1224, 1228-29 (D. Kan. 1996) (abstention and primary 
jurisdiction); and Student Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & 
Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1537 (D.N.J. 1984) (primary jurisdiction), affd, 759 F.2d 
1131 (3d Cir. 1985). 
2. See Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 890 (county government); Orange Environment, 923 
F. Supp. at 530 (county government); Davies, 43 ERC at 1225 (private company). 
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cases. This may stem from a belief that "[c]itizen activism in envi­
ronmental ... enforcement ... can lead to tension between the 
government and the governed. The government may fear that citi­
zen involvement in environmental enforcement will disrupt its own 
enforcement efforts and reduce its flexibility to tailor enforcement 
decisions to particular circumstances"3 as well as consume scarce 
public funds on issues that may be of secondary importance. The 
irony of the situation becomes apparent when one realizes that 
even as government regulators side with defendants against private 
citizens, government officials lavish praise on the citizen suit pro­
cess generally.4 All the while, Congress, unwilling to correct certain 
obvious inadequacies in the statutory sections, continues to copy 
these sections verbatim from one environmental statute into an­
other, thereby preserving the textual flaws and ambiguities. 
What was Congress's intent in providing essentially the same 
citizen suit provision in all modern environmental laws? Have they 
fulfilled that purpose, and, if not, what barriers have prevented 
this? Finally, what needs to be changed, either judicially or legisla­
tively, to reinvigorate the citizen suit process? 
It is the thesis of this Article that citizen suits, as they are cur­
rently drafted and interpreted, fail to fulfill their true potential. 
The defects in the text of various citizen suit provisions, and the 
inconsistent interpretation given them by the courts, prevent pri­
vate parties adversely affected by pollution from acting effectively 
in the absence of government enforcement. Simultaneously, citizen 
suits, as they are currently employed, discourage the business com­
munity from cooperating with government agencies ip correcting 
known environmental problems. Finally, citizen suits, as currently 
used by various private groups, seriously interfere with effective 
government regulatory action because the initiation of a citizen suit 
removes the threat of an enforcement action, which is the principal 
3. Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, A Comparative Look at the Role of Citizens ill Envi­
ronmental Enforcement, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., June 1997, at 29, 29. 
4. As one Senate report stated, "[c]itizen suits are a proven enforcement tool. 
They operate as Congress intended-to both spur and supplement . . . government 
enforcement actions. They have deterred violators and achieved significant compliance 
gains." This same report added: "In the past two years, the number of citizen suits to 
enforce NPDES permits has surged so that such suits now constitute a substantial por­
tion of all enforcement ... under this Act." S. REP. No. 99-50, at 28 (1985); see also 
Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part II, 14 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10063, 10063 (1984) [hereinafter Miller, Part II]; Doris K. Nagel, Com­
ment, Environmental Law-Citizen Suits and Recovery of Civil Penalties, 36 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 529, 532 (1988). 
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coercive mechanism available to regulators. These suits can force a 
government agency to expend a significant part of its diminishing 
public resources to address matters that may be of significance to a 
few well-financed individuals and organizations, but may ultimately 
prove to be of limited importance to protecting the environment. 
.This Article concludes that these deficiencies may be resolved 
if the courts, or preferably Congress, permit the development of a 
unified theory that identifies when an administrative enforcement 
action will be deemed sufficient to bar initiation of an independent 
citizen suit. Specifically, it is advanced that a private citizen should 
be prohibited from bringing suit against an alleged polluter if an 
appropriate federal or state administrative agency has (i) brought 
suit in federal or state court with respect to the specific acts in ques­
tion, (ii) entered into an administrative consent order with the vio­
lator, or, in very limited circumstances, (iii) entered into a formal 
memorandum of understanding with the violator. Development of 
such a theory will inevitably place effective veto power over envi­
ronmental enforcement in the hands of government regulators, but 
will preserve the rights of citizen plaintiffs to act when the govern­
ment cannot or will not do so. 
Part I of this Article generally examines the text and legislative 
history of the citizen suit provisions. Part II discusses the case law 
relevant to an interpretation of these provisions. Part III advances 
a modest proposal for the revision of these statutes. . 
I. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. Statutory Language of Citizen Suit Provisions 
All major environmental laws, specifically the Clean Air Act,S 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the 
Clean Water Act,6 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
("RCRA"),7 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),8 as well as a host of 
less well known environmental laws, such as the Toxic Substances 
Control Act,9 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act,lO contain essentially the same citizen suit provisions.ll They 
5. 42 u.s.c. §§ 7401-7671 (1994). 
6. 33 u.s.c. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
7. 42 U.S.c. §§ 6901-6992 (1994). 
8. 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
9. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2692 (1994). 
10. 30 U.s.c. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). 
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all trace their origin to section 304 of the Clean Air Act. In the 
beginning, Congress exhibited a "tendency to literally 'lift''' section 
304 of the Clean Air Act and "inc1ude[] [it] in all new federal envi­
ronmental statutes or major statutory amendments."12 Subse­
quently, several courts used the case law between statutes 
interchangeably.13 
The text of the citizen suit provisions is deceptively simple. For 
example, the Clean Water Act states the following: 
No action may be commenced­
(1) under subsection (a)(l) of this section­
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of 
the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State 
in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged 
violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or 
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is dili­
gently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the 
United States, or a State to require compliance with the stan­
dard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of 
the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of 
right.14 
Consequently, there are but two conditions which must be met in 
order to file a citizen suit. First, the citizen plaintiff must give notice 
to the violator, the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA"), and any relevant state agency before acting. Second, the 
suit may be commenced only if the appropriate government agency 
is not already "diligently prosecuting" its own action.15 
11. See 15 u.s.c. § 2619; 30 U.S.c. § 1270; 33 U.S.c. § 1365; 42 U.s.c. §§ 6972, 
7604, 9659; see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987), 
superseded by 844 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1987), affd, 493 U.S. 20 (1989); Miller, Part II, 
supra note 4, at 10063. 
12. Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part 
I, 13 ENVTL. L. REp. 10309, 10311 (1983) [hereinafter Miller, Part I]. 
13. See Hallstrom, 844 F.2d at 600 ("At least eight environmental statutes contain 
identical or similar provisions. Courts have construed these provisions identically de­
spite slight differences in wording." (citations omitted»; Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788, 
.792 (W.D. Okla. 1989) ("No circuit has addressed the sixty (60) days notice provision of 
section 9659. However, it is informative that some circuits have addressed the notice 
requirements of various other environmental statutes."). 
14. 33 U.S.c. §1365(b) (1994). Other statutes differ only slightly, usually to re­
flect structural differences in the laws. See sources cited supra note 11. Note also that 
CERCLA originally did not have a citizen suit provision but the 1986 SARA amend­
ments added one almost identical to the provision quoted above. See Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1703 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 9659 (1994». 
15. See Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas, 850 F.2d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 1988) ("There are 
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As discussed below, these two elements, the notice require­
ment and the diligent prosecution requirement, as well as a number 
of common law and prudential doctrines, have formed the crux of 
efforts by opponents to block or delay citizen suits.16 Poor drafting 
and worse interpretation of these two statutory elements has led to 
the successful prevention of citizen suits.17 The vague drafting and 
inconsistent interpretation, however, have not occurred in a vac­
uum. Conversely, they are the inevitable result of a "tension" in­
herent in Congress's attitude towards citizen participation in the 
enforcement process, specifically, the tension between Congress's 
intent to encourage citizen participation in environmental enforce­
ment and Congress's simultaneous desire to prevent citizen inter­
ference with government enforcement.18 This tension is most 
clearly revealed in the legislative history behind the citizen suit 
prOVIsIons. 
The legislative history of the citizen suit provisions itself has an 
interesting history of interpretation. Specifically, this author has 
previously argued that the pertinent legislative history complicates, 
rather than clarifies, the understanding of this statute because it 
presents two different and inherently contradictory positions taken 
by Congress with respect to citizen suits: (i) citizen suits are to be 
encouraged in order to aid government enforcement efforts; and 
(ii) citizen suits should be curtailed in order to avoid infringing on 
the discretion of administrative agencies.19 Another commentator 
has expressed it differently, suggesting that the citizen suit provi­
sions unequivocally express Congress's desire to secure citizen par­
ticipation in environmental enforcement, but that there was a 
subsequent struggle to direct the nature of such participation. Spe­
cifically, "[t]here is a difference ... between encouraging citizens to 
strike out on their own and encouraging them to inspire the agency 
who is supposed to do the job. "20 
only two limitations on the right of the citizen to bring suit. First, the citizen must give 
sixty days' notice. . .. Second, a citizen may not bring his or her own action if the 
'Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal 
action in a court of the United States ...."'); see also Miller, Part II, supra note 4, at 
10063-64. 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 591 F. 
Supp. 345, 351 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). 
18. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 64 (1986). 
19. See Robert D. Snook, Citizen Suits After Hallstrom· Can a Plaintiff Avoid 
Dismissal After Failing to Give Sixty Days' Notice?, 13 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 8 
(1991). 
20. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 63. 
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Whether characterized as a struggle about citizen participation 
or the form of that participation, the legislative history contains 
helpful references for those opposed to citizen suits. It is these ref­
erences that several courts have used to defeat citizen initiatives, 
and it is therefore helpful to examine the legislative record. 
B. Legislative History of the Citizen Suit Provisions 
Some of the comments by legislators involved in passage of the 
various citizen suit provisions suggest that Congress viewed citizen 
suits as an inexpensive alternative to government enforcement, and 
that the provisions were therefore included in an effort to en­
courage the EPA, or relevant state agencies, to act when appropri­
ate.21 From these comments, it appears clear that Congress, at least 
in part, believed that the provisions would allow citizens to act as 
private attorneys general and enforce the laws directly.22 Implicit 
in this approach was the view that individual citizens, because they 
would be directly affected by the pollution, would be especially mo­
tivated, and thus uniquely effective, advocates. Furthermore, it was 
assumed that the EPA was understaffed and its resources 
inadequate.23 
Alternatively, there were some who viewed citizen suits with 
suspicion, fearing that the citizen suit provisions would cause a 
flood of litigation, thereby blocking the courts and hindering the 
government's own regulatory actions.24 In addition, some authori­
ties were concerned that citizen suits, because they are not con­
trolled by a single national agency, would result in haphazard 
application of environmental laws.25 
As a consequence, it is possible to conclude that "[c]itizen ini­
tiatives to enforce the ... pollution laws [were] encouraged in vari­
ous ways, notably by allowing recovery of the costs of litigation, 
including attorney's and expert witness fees, and extending inter­
vention as of right in related cases."26 "This explicit prodding of 
citizen action [was] blurred somewhat by the legislative insistence, 
21. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
22. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing 
S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 35-36 (1970». 
23. See 116 CONGo REC. 32,925 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska). 
24. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. 
25. See Nagel, supra note 4, at 532-33; L. Ward Wagstaff, Note, Citizen Suits and 
the Clean Water Act: The Supreme Court Decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesa­
peake Bay Foundation, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 891, 894 (1988). 
26. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 63. 
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equally vehement, that the citizen suit section is -cbnstructed in a 
way 'to encourage and provide for agency enforcement'" by virtue 
of the notice and diligent prosecution requirements.27 Interestingly, 
the dichotomy of opinion referred to above can be found in the 
legislative history of each of the environmental laws beginning with 
the Clean Air Act and running through the reauthorization debates 
for CERCLA. 
For example, with respect to the first view, some in Congress 
said during the legislative debates surrounding passage of the Clean 
Air Act that the suits were permitted in order "to both goad the 
responsible agencies to more vigorous enforcement of anti-pollu­
tion standards and, if the agencies remained inert, to provide an 
alternative enforcement mechanism."28 Senator Muskie stated that 
"[s]tate and local governments have not responded adequately [to 
the need for enforcement]. It is clear that enforcement must be 
toughtened [ sic]. . . . More tools are needed, and the Federal pres­
ence and backup authority must be increased."29 Indeed, it was be­
lieved that "[g]overnment initiative in seeking enforcement under 
the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to 
bring suits for violations ... should motivate governmental ... en­
forcement and abatement proceedings."3o 
Opponents of the provisions claimed that insisting on the need 
for alternative private enforcement in effect denigrated the profes­
sionalism of the responsible government agencies.31 Therefore, as a 
second justification for introducing citizen suits, Senator Muskie ar­
gued that citizen suits provided a valuable source of assistance to 
the overworked agencies: "I think it is too much to presume that, 
however well staffed or well intentioned these enforcement agen­
cies, they will be able to monitor the potential violations. "32 
Thus, in regard to citizen suit provisions generally, the legisla­
tive history of the Clean Air Act supports the view that Congress's 
intent was to push government regulators to greater enforcement 
action and to supplement their thinly stretched resources. As one 
article noted, citizen suits were designed to "expand the scope of 
27. Id. 
28. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing S. 
REP. No. 91-1196, at 35-36 (1970». 
29. 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1970 
226 (1974); see also S. REp. No. 91-1196, at 36-39. 
30. S. REp. No. 91-1196, at 36-37; see also Miller, Part II, supra note 4, at 10064. 
3l. See Miller, Part II, supra note 4, at 10064. 
32. 116 CONGo REc. 32,925 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska). 
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enforcement without burdening public funds and encourage public 
authorities to enforce environmentallaws."33 
An entirely different view of the role of private parties is seen, 
however, with· regard to the inclusion of the notice and diligent 
prosecution provisions. The very existence of these sections implies 
that Congress was hesitant to allow unfettered citizen access to the 
courtS.34 For example, Senator Hruska remarked, "[t]he function­
ing of the department could be interfered with, and its time and 
resources frittered away by responding to these suits."35 Conse­
quently, the two previously mentioned restrictions were placed on 
citizen suits to assure that they would complement, and not inter­
fere with, federal regulatory and enforcement programs. "This is 
confirmed by ... the precluding of [citizen] suits if a compliance 
action is being 'diligently' prosecuted."36 As one court noted, these 
two sections combined suggest that "Congress intended to provide 
for citizens' suits in a manner that would be least likely to clog al­
ready burdened federal courts and most likely to trigger govern­
mental action which would alleviate any need for judicial relief."37 
As noted above, the citizen suit provisions first described in the 
Clean Air Act were copied, essentially verbatim, in each of the suc­
ceeding environmental laws passed over the following two decades. 
In most cases there was little discussion of the need for citizen suits 
or how to provide for such suits. To the extent there was any dis­
cussion of the issue, it tended to simply echo the arguments heard 
during passage of the Clean Air Act. 
For example, during passage of the Clean Water Act, what lit­
tle is found in the legislative history with respect to citizen suits 
reiterates the point that "if the agency had not initiated abatement 
proceedings following notice or if the citizen believed efforts initi­
ated by the agency to be inadequate, the citizen might choose to 
file" a citizen suit.38 The record continues, pointing out that the 
courts would then examine the agency's actions to determine if they 
were adequate and would then permit, consolidate, or dismiss the 
33. Wagstaff, supra note 25, at 894. 
34. See Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985). 
35. 116 CONGo REC. 32,925 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska). 
36. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 63. 
37. Baughman V. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting 
City of Highland Park V. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975» (citing 116 CONGo 
REC. 32,926 and 33,102 (remarks of Senator Muskie); 116 CONGo REc. 33,183 (remarks 
of Senator Hart». ' 
38.S. REp. No. 92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746. 
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cItlzen action as required.39 It is clear that citiien actions were 
deemed supplementary to agency proceedings, and further, that the 
courts were to act as arbiters of whether such private efforts could 
continue in the face of some form of governme~t enforcement.4o 
This is not to say that citizen participation was to be discouraged. 
"The [EPA] and the State should actively seek, encourage and assist 
the involvement and participation of the public in . . . enforce­
ment."41 However, note that in two adjacent paragraphs, the legis­
lative history refers on the one hand to its "[c]oncern" about 
"frivolous and harassing [citizen] actions," and on the other hand, 
to "legitimate [citizen] actions" as "a public service."42 Thus, even 
in the brief references to citizen suits in the Clean Water Act, there 
is evidence that Congress viewed such actions as both a valuable 
public service and as a potential threat to environmental enforce­
ment at the same time. 
Similarly, during the CERCLA reauthorization debates, sev­
eral representatives commented on the absence of a provision al­
lowing citizens to sue in cases of imminent endangerment (as is 
permitted by RCRA) and complained that "[t]he argument that cit­
izens' suits would interfere with an energetic and well organized 
cleanup program simply is not supported by the facts. "43 In fact, 
the House Report expressly stated that the notice and diligent pros­
ecution requirements would prevent such private enforcement ac­
tions from impeding government efforts.44 For reasons that will be 
of interest later, it should be noted that the Report added that dili­
gent prosecution might include either the actual filing of a lawsuit 
by the EPA or some other "aggressive" enforcement action, such as 
an administrative order.45 Any such activity could constitute a suf­
ficient bar 
to ensure that such enforcement actions will not be deterred by 
the diversion of resources that such suits might otherwise engen­
der. The bars are also necessary to avoid the confusion or termi­
nation of settlement negotiations because EPA, a State, or 
potentially responsible parties face citizen suit litigation relative 
39. See id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3746. 
40. See id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3746. 
41. [d. at 12, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3679. 
42. [d. at 81, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3747. 
43. H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 289-90 (1985), reprinted in 1986 u.S.C.C.A.N. 
2835, 2964-65. 
44. See id., pt. 3, at 35-36, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3058-59. 
45. [d., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3058-59. 
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to matters under negotiation. The basic concept is that the pur­
pose of citizens suits is to augment, not duplicate, government 
enforcement efforts. Consequently, instances where EPA or a 
State are involved in good faith negotiations will be protected 
from the drain and disruption that might otherwise be created by 
citizen suits.46 
It is thus clear that, as late as the 1986 reauthorization debates 
for CERCLA, Congress continued to be of two minds with respect 
to citizen suits: first, that citizens should be granted wide latitude to 
protect themselves, and simultaneously, that citizen suits pose a 
threat to government enforcement that should be restricted to lim­
ited circumstances. 
The "inherent tension between citizen as independent agent 
and as conscience of the public authorities is reflected in both the 
statute and the case law."47 For example, the Second Circuit has 
stated that "citizen suits ... reflect[] a deliberate choice by Con­
gress to widen citizen access to the courts, as a supplemental and 
effective assurance that the Act would be implemented and en­
forced."48 Other courts have examined the same legislative history 
and found that the limitations on citizen suits were the result of 
Congress's "inten[t] to give the EPA an opportunity to resolve is­
sues regarding the interpretation of complex environmental stan­
dards by negotiation, unhindered by the threat of an impending 
lawsuit,"49 and "thereby reduce the volume of costly private envi­
ronmentallitigation."50 
Congress's efforts to hammer out a compromise to allow citi­
zens to sue, yet preserve the overall authority of government regu­
lators, has resulted in a badly fractured legislative history that 
provides judges abundant opportunity to justify expanding or re­
stricting the citizen suit provisions as they see fit. Consequently, 
there is not a consistent and logical interpretation of when a given 
government enforcement effort will be deemed to be adequate, and 
therefore, when a citizen suit will be prohibited. 
46. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3058-59. 
47. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 64. 
48. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976). 
49. Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985); see also 
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1987), affd, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) 
("[L]egislative history reftect[s] Congress's belief that ... citizen enforcement through 
the courts should be secondary to administrative enforcement by the EPA."). 
50. Walls, 761 F.2d at 317. 
321 1998] ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS 
II. CASE LAW 
The starting point for judicial interpretation of citizen suits is 
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Gwaltney of Smithfield, 
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.51 In Gwaltney, the Court 
stated that the purpose of citizen suits is to supplement, not sup­
plant, government enforcement.52 Interestingly, the Gwaltney 
Court concluded that it is necessary to free enforcement agencies 
from citizen suits that might impede their freedom of action in or­
der to avoid unnecessarily limiting the discretion of government au­
thorities.53 The Court at one point noted the following: 
Permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act could 
undermine the supplementary role envisioned for the citizen suit. 
This danger is best illustrated by an example. Suppose that the 
Administrator identified a violator of the Act and issued a com­
pliance order . . . . Suppose further that the Administrator 
agreed not to assess or otherwise seek civil penalties on the con­
dition that the violator take some extreme corrective action, such 
as to install particularly effective but expensive machinery, that it 
otherwise would not be obliged to take. If citizens could file suit, 
months or years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that the 
Administrator chose to forgo, then the Administrator's discre­
tion to enforce the Act in the public interest would be curtailed 
considerably.54 
The complexity of the issues involved necessitates dividing the 
decisional law subsequent to Gwaltney into two sections: one for 
notice and one for diligent prosecution. 
A. Notice 
Following Gwaltney, the primary case of interest with respect· 
to the notice requirement is Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,55 
which concluded, consistent with the Supreme Court's generally 
strict view of citizen suits, that notice is a mandatory jurisdictional 
prerequisite, the absence of which unequivocally bars a suit.56 In 
Hallstrom, the Court came down firmly on the side of those who 
would restrict the rights of citizens to bring private enforcement ac­
tions, concluding that the language of RCRA is mandatory and re­
51. 484 U.S. 49 (1989). 
52. See id. at 60. 
53. See id. at 61. 
54. Id. at 60-6l. 
55. 493 U.S. 20 (1989). 
56. See id. at 33. 
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quires notice before suit may be filed.57 The Court buttressed its 
holding by stating that the legislative history indicated that Con­
gress was concerned with avoiding burdening the judicial system 
with a flood of litigation if citizen suits were permitted too gener­
ously.58 The Supreme Court, however, did not define what consti­
tutes notice. The Court's silence on this point left open the slim 
possibility that citizen plaintiffs could escape a motion to dismiss if 
they had provided the defendant polluter with some form of written 
communication at least intimating a meaningful possibility of a 
lawsuit.59 
Several post-Hallstrom courts have found ways to avoid a lit­
eral interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding. For example, in 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chemical Co. ,60 a district court 
judge held that 
a strict application of the notice requirement can be procedurally 
unwieldy for litigants and courts. For instance, a strict applica­
tion of the notice requirement would require a plaintiff to send 
an additional notice to the EPA, state administrator and permit­
tee for every subsequent permit violation occurring after the suit 
was filed.61 
The court went even further and relaxed the element of the notice 
requirement that mandates listing the character of the violation, 
thus informing plaintiffs that they need only "illuminate the param­
eters that have been exceeded."62 
Other courts have similarly found ways to blunt the effect of 
Hallstrom. For example, in City of New York v. Anglebrook Ltd. 
Partnership ,63 and in Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hercu­
les, Inc. ,64 courts discovered sufficient flexibility in the statutory 
. text, and the Hallstrom decision, to hold less formal notice to de­
fendants and the EPA to be sufficient.65 In effect, these courts were 
willing to stretch the definition of what constitutes notice to include 
57. See id. 
58. See id. at 28-29. It should be noted that the Court cited the legislative history 
of the Clean Air Act, because that Act's legislative history is evidently the most 
extensive. 
59. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989, 998 
(W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'd, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988). 
60. 900 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
61. Id. at 77. 
62. Id. 
63. 891 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
64. 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995). 
65. See id. at 1248; Anglebrook, 891 F. Supp. at 905. 
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informal letters and other communications in an effort to avoid dis­
missing a citizen suit. 
Under no circumstances, however, should citizen plaintiffs be­
lieve that they can count on generous treatment for technical notice 
deficiencies. The Supreme Court's holding in Hallstrom is clear: 
notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit and not a procedural 
nicety.66 As a practical matter, there is little room for argument 
regarding the Supreme Court's holding. Although some courts 
have been willing to stretch matters somewhat, others have been 
happy to bar citizen suits for failings of the notice requirement that 
appear minor indeed. For example, in National Environmental 
Foundation v. ABC Rail Corp. ,67 the court applied the notice re­
quirement rigorously and added, in an interesting aside, "that an­
other purpose behind the notice requirement of Section 1365 is to 
effectuate Congress's preference that the Act be enforced by gov­
ernmental prosecution."68 The court thus articulated a view of citi­
zen suits that appears to have been held by many in Congress 
during the debates (specifically those who repeatedly expressed 
their fears that citizen suits would interfere with government initia­
tives) and by many in the judiciary (such as the Supreme Court), 
but was rarely expressed so succinctly. 
Ultimately, the best advice that can be given to citizen plain­
tiffs with regard to the notice requirement is to abide by the terms 
of the statute precisely and to provide the EPA and the putative 
defendant with timely notice of the fact that a suit is contemplated, 
who the defendants are, the violations complained of, and the stat­
utes under which suit will be brought. Even if a court might be 
willing to overlook deficiencies in notice, it may be a waste of re­
sources fighting the issue, and the Hallstrom decision gives defend­
ants a powerful weapon to delay or derail citizen suits at their 
onset. 
B. Diligent Prosecution 
1. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co. 
Like the notice provision, "little or no judicial guidance exists 
66. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 33 (1989). 
67. 926 F.2d 1096 (11th Cir. 1991). 
68. Id. It should be noted that the court provided no justification for its conclu­
sion that Congress would prefer governmental enforcement. 
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as to what constitutes ailigent prosecution."69 Unlike the notice el­
ement, the diligent prosecution requirement has not benefitted 
from efforts at clarification by the Supreme Court. As discussed 
below, the lack of statutory definition and the hazy legislative his­
tory have engendered contradictory opinions. This has served to 
confuse practitioners and offer judges with any set of predilections 
an array of precedent to support any conclusion they so choose. 
An early example of a discussion centering on the diligent 
prosecution requirement can be found in Baughman v. Bradford 
Coal Co.,7° in which the Pennsylvania Department of Environmen­
tal Resources began an administrative action against Bradford Coal 
Company for civil penalties related to certain violations of the 
Clean Air Act.n Subsequently, a group of private citizens seeking 
similar penalties initiated an action in federal district court with re­
spect to the same violations.72 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit stated that "[g]enerally, the word 'court' in a 
statute is held to refer only to the tribunals of the judiciary and not 
to those of an executive agency with quasi-judicial powers."73 The 
court added that "[n]evertheless, an administrative board may be a 
'court' if its powers and characteristics make such a classification 
necessary to achieve statutory goals."74 Interestingly, the court 
found that the administrative agency in question (the Pennsylvania 
DEP) did not have the authority to provide relief that is "the sub­
stantial equivalent to that available to the EPA in federal courts," 
and also found that it did not afford citizen involvement as a matter 
of right.75 The court therefore held that the administrative action 
under review was substantively different from a judicial proceeding 
and that the agency was therefore not a "court" for purposes of the 
Clean Air Act.76 
The Baughman decision is important for several reasons. It 
was the first decision to hold that administrative proceedings could 
be the equivalent of judicial actions and, therefore, that such pro­
ceedings could bar a simultaneous citizen suit.77 Furthermore, the 
69. Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, 
Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985). 
70. 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979). 
71. Seeid.at217. 
72. See id. 
73. /d. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 219. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. at 217. 
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significance of the Baughman court's reasoning can be recognized 
by evaluating citizen suits in the context of regulatory actions. Spe­
cifically, regulatory agencies are not always eager to take a violator 
to court because any court action is an expensive gamble, especially 
if the perceived violations are considered relatively minor. In such 
cases, government agencies may instead choose to enter into an ad­
ministrative consent agreement. 
The form and content of such consent agreements vary from 
state to state. As a general rule, these agreements, which are ulti­
mately ratified by a court, are made between the agency and the 
offending party. The offending party agrees to perform certain ac­
tions, such as cleaning a site, stopping certain emissions, or paying a 
fine, and, in return, the agency refrains from filing suit.78 Often, 
such agreements include a stipUlation that noncompliance with the 
consent agreement will automatically result in penalties and/or an 
injunction.79 
Such agreements are, of course, favored by regulators, because 
they generally offer a practical solution to the environmental con­
cern and accomplish the goal of protecting the public at a small 
fraction of the cost of litigation. As one court noted, "[b ]ypassing 
the time and expense required by litigation is an obvious plus."80 
Furthermore, such agreements often achieve more for the protec­
tion of the environment than a conventional lawsuit, because a 
greater portion of the settlement amount is likely to be used for 
clean-up as opposed to attorneys' fees. 
Finally, consent agreements are generally quick and efficient 
mechanisms for resolving an issue. "The courts have long recog­
nized that public policy favors settlements as a cost-efficient means 
of resolving disputes and conserving judicial resources. "81 This is 
especially true in environmental actions, because consent agree­
ments "relieve the government of considerable burdens on its lim­
ited resources."82 Even if successful, a lawsuit takes years, 
particularly if appeals are involved. Consent agreements can be fi­
nalized in a few months and allow the remediation to start before 
the contamination spreads further. Time, therefore, is a critical fac­
tor in remediation efforts. 
78. See, e.g., EPA, OSWER DlREcrJVE No. 9835.17, MODEL CERCLA RDIRA 
CONSENT DECREE (1991). 
79. See id. § XXI. 
80. United States v. Bliss, 133 F.R.D. 559, 567 (E.D. Mo. 1990). 
81. Id. (citing Kiefer Oil & Gas Co. v. McDougal, 229 F. 933 (8th Cir. 1915)}. 
82. Id. 
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2. Alternatives to Baughman 
It must, however, be remembered that other courts have not 
been willing to extend the language of the citizen suit provisions. In 
fact, two circuits have expressly rejected Baughman.83 . 
Specifically, inFriends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted 
that the language of the citizen suit provision in the Clean Water 
Act expressly limits citizen suits if an action is proceeding "in a 
court of the United States, or a State."84 The court continued, stat­
ing that the inclusion of the citizen suit provisions reflects a desire 
on the part of Congress to encourage citizen participation in enforc­
ing environmentallaws.85 The court concluded that "[t]o interpret 
[the section] to include administrative as well as judicial proceed­
ings is in our view contrary to both the plain language of the statute 
and congressional intent. "86 
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]e prefer the Second 
Circuit's reading of section 1365 over the Third Circuit's reading. 
Section 1365 does refer specifically to 'courts,' and it makes no di­
rect or veiled reference to any type of administrative proceeding. "87 
Noting that other statutes specifically state that a citizen suit is pro­
hibited if either a judicial or administrative action is pending, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]his contrast dispels any lingering 
ambiguity."88 
3. Developments Since Baughman 
While it is true that Baughman has been rejected in the Second 
and Ninth Circuits, it has been followed elsewhere.89 For example, 
in Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp. ,90 the court adopted the reasoning of the Baughman decision 
and added that "[t]here is no question, and the parties do not disa­
83. See Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1525 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985). 
84. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d at 62. 
85. See id. at 63. 
86. Id. 
87. Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d at 1525. 
88. Id. 
89. See, e.g., Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 
1320 (7th Cir. 1991); Sierra Club v. Colorado Ref. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428 (D. Col. 1993); 
North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 755 F. Supp. 484 (D. 
Mass. 1991), affd, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991). 
90. 591 F. Supp. 345 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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gree, that ... administrative proceedings may, as a general proposi­
tion, be deemed the equivalent of state court action under [the 
citizen suit provisions]."91 The court then turned to an examination 
of the nature of the administrative procedure in question and con­
cluded that "[b]ecause [the state agency] is empowered to impose 
civil penalties on violators in amounts up to $10,000.00 a day, to 
seek criminal penalties, and to require the Attorney General to 
seek injunctive relief, its actions have generally been found to rep­
resent the statutory equivalent of court action."92 The court con­
cluded that the administrative action was sufficient evidence that 
the enforcement agency was diligently prosecuting an action against 
the polluter though no lawsuit was ever filed. 93 
Other courts have also followed Baughman. In North and 
South Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town ofScituate ,94 the Massa­
chusetts Department of Environmental Protection entered into a 
consent decree in 1987 with the Town of Scituate with respect to 
violations of the Massachusetts Clean Water Act, a statute which 
the judge declared to be comparable to the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act ("FWPCA").95 Two years later, a citizens group 
brought an action in federal court under the federal law for the 
same violations.96 
The district court dismissed the case, finding that the consent 
order "represent[ ed] a substantial, considered and on-going re­
sponse to the violation," and therefore constituted "diligent en­
forcement."97 In response to the plaintiffs' argument that the 
consent order was not evidence of the required diligence, the dis­
trict court stated the following: 
Congress's express intent "to recognize, preserve, and protect the 
primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, re­
duce, and eliminate pollution," ... cautions against so confining 
an interpretation. Indeed, the statute calls for a more deferential 
approach that does not circumscribe the administrator's discre­
tion to implement a plan that, in his expert judgment, adequately 
addresses a violation.98 
91. Id. at 348. 
92. Id. at 348-49 (citations omitted). 
93. See id. at 350-53. 
94. 755 F. Supp. 484 (D. Mass.), affd, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991). 
95. See id. at 486. 
96. See id. at 484. 
97. Id. at 487. 
98. Id. 
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Interestingly, in reviewing the decision of the district court, the 
First Circuit made the following statement: 
The focus of the statutory bar to citizen's suits is not on state 
statutory construction, but on whether corrective action already 
taken and diligently pursued by the government seeks to remedy 
the same violations as duplicative civilian action. . . . Duplicative 
enforcement actions add little or nothing to compliance actions 
already underway, but do divert State resources away from reme­
dying violations in order to focus on the duplicative effort.99 
4. Specific Issues in Determining Diligent Prosecution 
It is clear, therefore, that some courts view the citizen suit pro­
visions as expressing a preference for government regulatory ac­
tion, and these courts will look hard for reasons to block citizen 
suits that are perceived as infringing on government prerogatives or 
wasting government assets.IOO On the other hand, as discussed be­
low, citizen plaintiffs have had numerous successes after Baughman 
in demonstrating that government administrative actions are not 
sufficiently diligent to forestall private actions. Typically, citizen 
plaintiffs prevail when there has been (i) a history of noncompli­
ance,lOl (ii) the imposition of trivial penalties,102 and (iii) no citizen 
participation.lo3 
For example, in New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New 
York City Department of Sanitation,l04 the defendant Department 
of Sanitation made the tactical mistake of claiming that the Depart­
ment of Natural Resources had been diligent in its oversight of the 
defendant's Pelham Bay Landfill,lo5 The court, in between refer­
ences to the "sordid details of this bureaucratic and political 
nightmare,"106 responded that such a claim "cannot be taken seri­
99. North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 
556 (1st Cir. 1991). 
100. See North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc., 755 F. Supp. at 487 (concluding 
that the agency's actions were "substantial, considered and ongoing," because they in­
cluded a fixed timetable and expressly left open the possibility of future civil and crimi­
nal actions against the polluters). 
101. See New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York City Dep't of Sanita­
tion, 772 F. Supp. 162, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
102. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. 
Supp. 470, 491 (D.S.C. 1995). 
103. See Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 841 (S.D. Ohio 1996); 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 491. 
104. 772 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
105. See id. at 164. 
106. [d. at 163. 
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ously in light of the fact that relief is not in sight [for at least four 
more years)."107 The court went on to note that the state had been 
involved since 1983, and, based on the state's own timetables for 
correcting the problems, "at least twelve years will run before the 
problem is rectified. This is not diligent prosecution."108 The court 
then directed attention to the 1985 Order as "a perfect example of 
the state's lack of diligence," and held up to scorn the state's efforts 
in the 1985 Order to set up a temporary remediation plan (which 
took three years) while seeking compliance with the 1985 Order.109 
After reviewing the defendant's responses to the 1985 Order, 
the court concluded that "[t)he state was acting as a pen pal, not a 
prosecutor."110 Turning then to the 1990 Order, the court noted 
that it permitted the defendants to pollute for five more years while 
failing to develop a permanent plan as required by the 1985 Or­
der.1l1 "It is simply incomprehensible that the discharge of leachate 
. . . which was to be a temporary measure adopted to remedy the 
problem, should continue for seven years. . .. This is precisely such 
an instance when the government has not been fulfilling its 
duties."112 
If nothing else, this case shows the folly of using the diligent 
prosecution defense in cases where there is a long history of official 
de facto recognition of noncompliance, complete with toothless 
consent orders and general incompetence. Particularly damning in 
this regard are situations in which government efforts proceed over 
many years without demonstrable effect and smack of over-cozy re­
lationships with polluters. 
Another factor of importance in determining if regulators have 
indeed been diligent is the amount of fines imposed in relation to 
total potential fines recoverable under the relevant statutes. For 
example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services (TOC), Inc.,113 Laidlaw faced fines potentially totaling up 
to $2.27 million and negotiated an actual fine of only a modest 
$100,000.114 Interestingly, the court specifically noted that, contrary 
to the policy of using fines and penalties to remove any economic 
107. Id. at 170. 
108. Id. at 168. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. See id. at 169. 
112. Id. 
113. 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995). 
114. See id. at 491. 
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incentive for polluting, this reduced fine included no amount re­
flecting the economic advantage enjoyed by the company for failing 
to abide.115 
Another factor influencing the court to rule in favor of the citi­
zen plaintiffs was the fact that the defendant was permitted by the 
regulatory agency to draft and file the complaint against itself; this 
included the defendant paying the required filing fee. 116 In addi­
tion, it appeared that the consent order was completed in unusual 
haste, such haste in fact that the private plaintiffs were effectively 
denied an opportunity to participate.117 
The absence of an opportunity for true citizen intervention was 
again found to be a reason to hold that there was no "diligent pros­
ecution" in Frilling v. Village of Anna. 118 In Frilling, the court de­
clined to find that a state's actions were diligent primarily because, 
while the state had invoked an administrative proceeding, there had 
been no formal adversary process, hearing, or witnesses, and the 
citizens were never permitted to intervene or even comment on the 
enforcement action.119 
While the above cases clearly show that attempts to sanitize 
past violations by pressing compliant regulators into ludicrously 
convenient consent orders will often backfire, the citizen plaintiff 
should not believe that reduced penalties or good agency-industry 
relationships will automatically prevent a violator from barring a 
citizen suit. For example, in Connecticut Fund for the Environment 
v. Contract Plating Co., 120 the state settled with a violator for a 
mere $3,500.121 The citizen plaintiffs argued that their action cov­
ered issues not found in the consent order. The court, however, 
ruled that "[t]he mere fact that the settlement [was less comprehen­
sive] than the remedy sought in the instant action [was] not suffi­
cient in itself to overcome the presumption that the state action was 
diligently prosecuted."122 The court's conclusion highlighted an im­
portant principle; specifically, that the context in which most chal­
115. See id. at 491-92. 
116. See id. at 479. 
117. See id. 
118. 924 F. Supp. 821, 838 (S.D. Ohio 1996); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 489-90 (finding no right to intervene 
and therefore no diligent prosecution); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828,830 
(W.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984). 
119. See Frilling, 924 F. Supp. at 841. 
120. 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986). 
121. See id. at 1294. 
122. Id. (emphasis added). 
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lenges to citizen suits arise will create a basic presumption in favor 
of the state by placing the burden of proving a lack of diligent pros­
ecution upon the citizens. This is true because citizens are required 
to serve notice upon the violator and the Administrator in advance 
of suit,123 This, of course, gives the defendants sixty or ninety days 
to prepare a defense, including a motion to dismiss arguing that the 
citizen action is precluded under the statute because the state or 
federal government is already diligently prosecuting an action. 
Even though it is the defendant's motion to dismiss, the burden 
of proof with respect to the issue of diligent prosecution will effec­
tively remain with the citizen plaintiffs because it is a necessary ele­
ment of the statute itself to be affirmatively proven by the 
plaintiff.124 Furthermore, there is a common law presumption of 
government regularity that reinforces the conclusion that a citizen 
plaintiff had better be prepared to prove that the state is not dili­
gently enforcing its environmental laws and not expect that the 
state will have to affirmatively demonstrate the effectiveness of its 
efforts.125 
In this regard, note the ruling in Orange Environment, Inc. ·v. 
County of Orange .126 In this case, the court acknowledged that the 
state's initial efforts to require compliance were stymied "by the 
recalcitrant and cavalier attitude adopted by the [defendant and] 
that the [defendant] consistently failed to comply with the terms of 
the Consent Orders."127 However, the court found that the state's 
enforcement efforts ultimately barred a citizen suit, primarily be­
cause "the standard for evaluating the diligence of the state in en­
forcing its action is a low one which requires due deference to the 
state's plan of attack ...."128 The court cited no support for this 
statement. 
It should be noted that a citizens group should not expect an 
enthusiastic judicial reception to an attempt to litigate an issue with 
a defendant with whom the regulatory agency has already entered 
into a settlement agreement. For example, in Arkansas Wildlife 
Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc., 129 the state agency issued an order 
123. See 33 U.S.c. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1994); see also sources cited supra note 11. 
124. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). 
125. See, e.g., Leib v. Board of Exam'rs for Nursing, 411 A.2d 42, 46 (Conn. 
1979). 
126. 860 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
127. Id. at 1017. 
128. Id. 
129. 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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which the polluter agreed to follow.130 The agency did allow third 
party involvement and subjected the violator to various 
penalties.131 
The citizens group, however, argued that only insignificant 
penalties had been extended and that compliance had been delayed 
repeatedly.132 The court concluded that citizens suits are intended 
to play an "'interstitial,' rather than 'potentially intrusive' role, 
[and] that such suits are proper only when the federal, state, or local 
agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility and that 
such suits should not considerably curtail the governing agency's 
discretion to act in the public interest."133 With respect to the alle­
gations that the polluter was being treated too leniently, the judge 
added that "[i]t would be unreasonable and inappropriate to find 
failure to diligently prosecute simply because leI prevailed in some 
fashion or because a compromise was reached."134 The court con­
cluded that the order acted as a bar to citizen enforcement.135 
Particularly interesting was the court's unwillingness to curtail 
the administrator's discretion to implement a plan. Implicit in this 
policy is the court's reliance on two principles. The first is that citi­
zen suits are designed to assist government enforcement, not ob­
struct it. The second is that it makes poor public policy to squander 
limited judicial resources in re-litigating environmental matters that 
have already been addressed. As one court described it in Gardeski 
v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 136 "[ t]o require an agency to com­
mence any form of proceeding would be senseless where the agency 
has already succeeded in obtaining the respondent's agreement to 
comply with the law in some enforceable form. "137 
Some federal courts have allowed citizen suits to proceed, even 
when state or federal agencies were in the process of actually liti­
gating suits against polluters. For instance, suits were allowed 
under the following circumstances: (i) when the enforcement 
agency's suit did not address the same factual matters as the private 
suits;138 (ii) when the public had no right to intervene in the 
130. See id. at 378. 
131. See id. at 380. 
132. See id. 
133. Id. 
134. /d. 
135. See id. at 382. 
136. 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
137. Id. at 1166. 
138. See Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 686 F. Supp. 
1044, 1052-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (providing that if government is actively pursuing an 
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agency's action;139 and (iii) when the relief sought by the citizen 
plaintiffs could not be afforded by the agency's actions.140 
5. Review of the Decisional Law 
Even a brief review of the decisional law demonstrates that it is 
unlikely that a regulatory agency will be found to be diligently pros­
ecuting an enforcement action if the following criteria are met: (i) 
there is a past history of noncompliance with consent orders and/or 
agency indifference generally;141 (ii) actual financial penalties are a 
tiny fraction of potential penalties;142 (iii) private parties are func­
tionally precluded from commenting or intervening;143 (iv) the con­
sent agreements contain generous deadlines for compliance;144 and 
(v) the relationship between regulator and regulated appears to be 
overly familiar, especially if the polluter is given carte blanche to 
draft consent documents.145 
Citizen plaintiffs can, however, expect an uphill battle. Some 
courts have concluded, based upon existing precedent and legisla­
tive history, that there is a preference in the environmental laws in 
favor of government enforcement.146 This may be in order to foster 
national uniformity of environmental action, or possibly because of 
a belief, founded in New Deal logic of the 1930's, that administra­
tive agencies are the institutions with the necessary technical com­
petence to address complex and difficult issues. Whatever the 
theoretical basis, the result is that private parties may confront an 
ideological predilection on the part of the judiciary in favor of gov­
action, a citizen cannot get "personalized" relief, but stating that if the government's 
efforts do not address the same violations, a citizen suit may proceed). 
139. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) , Inc., 890 F. 
Supp. 470, 489-90 (D.S.C. 1995) (no right to intervene and therefore no diligent prose­
cution); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828, 830 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 747 
F.2d 99 (2d CiT. 1984). 
140. See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 
F. Supp. 1404, 1414-15 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (state agency lacked power to provide relief, 
citizen suit allowed). 
141. See New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York City Dep't of Sanita­
tion, 772 F. Supp. 162,169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
142. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. 
Supp. at 491. 
143. See Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 841 (S.D. Ohio 1996); 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 491. 
144. See New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F. Supp. at 169. 
145. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. 
Supp. at 491; New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F. Supp. at 169. 
146. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. 484 U.S. 
49, 59-60 (1989). 
334 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:311 
ernment, as opposed to private, enforcement action. This, com­
bined with an often cool reception to private endeavors on the part 
of the regulators themselves, and a sincerely held belief by some in 
government that industry is being crippled by complex and confus­
ing environmental regulations, means that the citizen plaintiff at­
tempting to halt violations of state or federal law is best advised to 
put on a credible case, very early in the litigation process, to con­
vi.nce a judge that the regulators have conspicuously failed to fulfill 
their duties and need to be given a strong nudge. 
Finally, it should be noted that permitting private enforcement 
actions to continue in the face of ongoing state or federal initiatives 
could arguably contravene a key element of national environmental 
policy. Specifically, federal environmental laws are designed to 
provide a single, uniform national environmental standard.147 If in­
dividual citizen actions at cross-purposes to government initiatives 
are allowed to continue, this will result inevitably in the creation of 
three separate and conflicting enforcement authorities (state, fed­
eral, and private) for each environmental issue. One court has even 
spoken of the threat of "balkanizing" enforcement authority in 
these circumstances148 and another has warned that citizen suits al­
low private parties to "commandeer the federal enforcement ma­
chinery"149 for their own private purposes. 
C. Non-Statutory Challenges 
In a small number of cases, defendants have raised, in addition 
to the statutory challenges of notice and diligent prosecution, 
several related common law doctrines, such as exhaustion of admin­
istrative remedies,150 primary jurisdiction,151 mootness,152 absten­
147. See United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 643, 646 (W.D. Ky. 1990). 
148. Sierra Club v. Colorado Ref. Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1483 (D. Colo. 1994). 
149. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300,1322 (S.D. Iowa 
1997). 
150. See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 
F.2d 231, 244 (3d Cir. 1980) (providing that sixty day notice requirement is a statutory 
time limit and thus doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be used to 
require more than sixty day period); United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 74 F.R.D. 
104, 107 (D. Alaska 1977). 
151. See Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 43 ERC 1224, 1229 (D. Kan. 
1996). In Davies, the court denied a motion to dismiss on abstention and primary juris­
diction grounds, but added the following: "It would ... make little practical sense. If 
the court takes jurisdiction of a matter in midstream of the administrative process, there 
is a good chance the result will either be a needless duplication of the agency's efforts or 
conflicting orders as to how to go about remedying the situation." Id.; see also Avoy­
elles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 920 (5th Cir. 1983) (providing 
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tion,153 intervention,154 and, if the defendant is a government 
agency, sovereign immunity.155 Most of these doctrines are, in a 
sense, relatives of the diligent prosecution requirement. 
Specifically, exhaustion of administrative remedies and the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction are mirror images of each other. 
The exhaustion requirement is involved if an administrative action 
is pending on a matter over which the agency has authority.156 In 
such cases a court is often deemed to be without jurisdiction to hear 
the matter until the agency has finished its review.157 
Abstention is a similar doctrine that arises when a plaintiff 
brings an action in federal court, but the state has a pending admin­
istrative action.15S Primary jurisdiction is involved if an action is 
not pending before an administrative agency but it appears to the 
court that the matter is within the special expertise of the agency. 
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not applicable if raised first on appeal and 
there is no evidence that agency intends to act); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. 
Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (holding that the doctrine of prinlary 
jurisdiction is not applicable to questions within the competency of the court); Student 
Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 
1528, 1537 (D.N.J. 1984) (providing that the doctrine of prinlary jurisdiction is not ap­
plicable to questions within the competency of the court). 
152. See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 
128 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing citizen suit as moot where state action addressed same 
violations); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the 
ultimate filing of a suit by the EPA does not moot issue of whether EPA administrator 
should have sued company); Orange Env't, Inc. v. County of Orange, 923 F. Supp. 529, 
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (providing that compliance with EPA remediation order moots 
claim for injunctive relief). 
153. See Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1193 (6th Cir. 
1995) (providing that abstention doctrine may be appropriately invoked); Ada-Cascade 
Watch Co. v. Cascade Resource Recovery, Inc., 720 F.2d 897, 905-06 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(holding on specific facts of case that a federal court should abstain from second guess­
ing a decision by a state agency that no other permits were needed); Davies, 43 ERC at 
1229; see also Lake Carrier's Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Brewer v. City 
of Bristol, 577 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Tenn. 1983). 
154. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 101 F.R.D. 451, 458-59 
(W.D.N.Y.) (finding that permissive intervention under FED. R. Cry. P. 24 is not al­
lowed when it would further complicate a complex case), affd, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 
1984); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1080 n.7 
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that intervention is not permitted under the RCRA imminent 
endangerment provision), affd, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984). 
155. See District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 859-60 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(holding that federal courts can review an EPA veto of a state permit, but not an EPA 
decision not to veto a state permit). 
156. See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 
F.2d 231, 235-37 (3d Cir. 1980). 
157. See id. 
158. See Coalition for Health Concern, 60 F.3d at 1194. 
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Courts, in this instance, will generally require plaintiffs first to bring 
their case before the agency and then to court if necessary.159 
Obviously, these doctrines are essentially prudential matters 
which permit courts to shuttle complicated matters off to the rele­
vant regulatory agencies. The reasons are obvious. In some cases, 
courts lack the necessary technical expertise.160 In others, it is sim­
ply a reflection of the principle of federalism to defer to an existing 
state proceeding.161 In any event, it is simply poor judicial economy 
for a court to adjudicate a matter that is being, or should be, re­
viewed by an appropriate administrative agency. 
At first blush, these doctrines might appear to offer polluters 
effective defenses. In practice, however, they are less than effective 
because they only require courts to look to see if an agency is, or 
should be, acting. This, of course, is precisely what the diligent 
prosecution and notice requirements do. Ultimately, if the agency 
. is notified and refuses to do anything, or an action is proceeding but 
ineffectively, the doctrines do not divest a court of jurisdiction and 
the case may proceed. 
Similarly, with the issue of mootness, if the subject matter of a 
dispute no longer exists, then a court has no power to hear the case, 
for federal courts do not give advisory opinions. Thus, if an agency 
compels a polluter to cease permanently (that is, the agency is dili­
gent in its enforcement of the matter) then there is no case left 
upon which to proceed. Mootness is even less of a defense for the 
reason that, while wholly past violations will not support a citizen 
suit,162 the time of relevance for determining mootness is the time 
of filing of the SUit.163 Therefore, compliance subsequent to the ini­
tiation of a suit will not affect jurisdiction. 
In sum, the occasional recourse made to these common law 
doctrines poses little concern for citizen plaintiffs. The issues ad­
dressed by these doctrines are in essence the same as those already 
covered by the two statutory requirements of notice and diligent 
prosecution. If the citizen group can meet the requirements listed 
159. See Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 
(E.D. Tenn. 1984). 
160. See id. (acknowledging that an issue may require special competence of ad­
ministrative agencies). 
161. See Coalition for Health Concern, 60 F.3d at 1194 (finding that Kentucky had 
an overriding interest in the protection of its environment). 
162. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 
49, 58-59 (1987). 
163. See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 
1537 (D.N.J. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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in the text of the laws, these prudential matters will rarely prove to 
be an additional barrier of substance. 
III. PROPOSALS 
A review of the case law makes it abundantly clear that, more 
than two decades after the initial enactment. of the relevant envi­
ronmental statutes, the federal courts have failed to fashion a con­
sistent and coherent body of law to guide public and private parties 
with respect to when and how citizen suits may be applied to pro­
tect human health, safety and the environment. The primary areas 
of concern have involved the notice issue164 and the diligent prose­
cution requirement,165 as well as the question of the applicability of 
various related common law and prudential doctrines.166 
The lack of consistency itself has created uncertainty which, in 
turn, has the potential to cause considerable disruption in the activi­
ties of environmental groups, government regulators and industry. 
Further, it appears as though the central problem with the citizen 
suit provisions (failure to define critical terms such as "diligent 
prosecution") was the result of attempting to paper over Congress's 
basic division during enactment of the Clean Air Act regarding the 
proper role of citizen plaintiffs in environmental enforcement. 
What was, for citizen activists and government regulators alike, a 
tragedy with respect to the Clean Air Act, became black comedy 
when Congress continued to use the same statutory language in 
each succeeding environmental law. 
Furthermore, though Congress cannot be faulted for failing to 
recognize in 1972 that future lawyers would attempt to cloud the 
citizen suit issue by raising collateral doctrines, such as abstention, 
mootness, exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary juris­
diction, it is inexcusable that, when the use of these doctrines be­
came clear, Congress continued to ignore them in drafting 
subsequent environmental legislation. j 
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has spoken 
with respect to the notice issue in Hallstrom. 167 This decision, while 
164. See generally Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989); Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chern. Co., 900 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 1995); City of New 
York v. Anglebrook Ltd. Partnership, 891 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
165. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979); Stu­
dent Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 
1528, 1535-37 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985). 
166. See supra notes 150-59. 
167. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31 (holding that "the notice and sixty day delay 
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not foreclosing controversy, has limited debate on this element. 
However, the time has come for Congress, or the courts, to attempt 
a long overdue resolution of the remaining areas of difficulty. 
This is not to say, however, that all authorities agree that 
change is needed. One commentator has even suggested that the 
legislative refusal to spell out in detail the relationship between pri­
vate and public enforcement efforts is for the best. 
[I]t very well may be that the Congress did the right thing by 
continuing the tension [between citizen as independent agent and 
as conscience of the regulatory agencies], not attempting to re­
solve it under a single consistent theory. Effective agency prods 
may be in need of a credible power to go it alone; and useful 
citizen scouts may work best when authorized to call in the 
agency troops. Perhaps also the best mutual efforts of official 
and unofficial enforcers over time requires an occasional setback 
for each, as where the agency is allowed to steal the thunder of 
the citizen initiative or is humiliated so thoroughly that a new 
boldness arises out of the ashes of past disgrace. That the combi­
nation of citizen as independent agent and as public conscience is 
a plausible one is suggested by the critical and empirical work 
that has been done on citizen action. For the most part, this de­
scribes a process that is closer to an adrenaline than a muscle 
mechanism. Citizen power is spent most usefully in initiatives 
that result in reinvigoration, reconsideration, and eventual take­
over by the responsible agency.168 
As interesting as this position is, it utterly fails to comport with 
the day-to-day reality of public and private enforcement operations, 
let alone the economic realities of business. Put quite simply, law is 
not practiced in a vacuum. Citizen suits may be a vital part of the 
regulatory scheme, but they can be very expensive to initiate. For a 
small neighborhood environmental group trying to preserve natural 
resources in their community, a citizen suit can be a costly gamble. 
Similarly, government regulators trying to decide which of sev­
eral hundred cases they can afford (literally) to address cannot ac­
cept having to set aside high priority cases to handle perhaps 
important but secondary matters or, worse yet, having complex set­
tlement discussions founder because of the well-meaning but poorly 
timed efforts of third parties. Furthermore, it is self-evident that 
uncertainty is a cost item for industry, a cost item that factors im­
requirements are mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit under the 
RCRA citizen suit provision"). 
168. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 64. 
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mediately into jobs in a globally interconnected commercial envi­
ronment. This is particularly true if one accepts that the 
relationship of regulatory agency to regulated industry is not prop­
erly one of predator to prey, but rather of symbiosis. Specifically, 
the purpose of regulation is not to destroy or punish, but to protect 
the environment-a goal that in general is best attained 
cooperatively. . 
If, however, it were possible to propose such a standard, it is 
suggested that citizens suits under the Clean Water Act, Clean Air 
Act, CERCLA and section 7001(a)(1)(A) of RCRA should be pro­
hibited if a state or federal administrative agency has (1) filed suit 
in state or federal court under one of the above-referenced federal 
laws or an analogous state statute offering substantially similar pen­
alties and citizen participation provisions, (2) entered into a consent 
order, filed in a state or federal court, addressing substantially the 
same violations advanced in the citizen suit, or (3) filed with a state 
or federal court an executed memorandum of understanding 
describing, in detail, the terms to be included in the eventual con­
sent order. It is stressed that any consent order or memorandum of 
understanding under either options (2) or (3) should include clear 
and specific procedures to ensure citizen participation and review, 
fixed time schedules for compliance, and effective civil remedies 
and default provisions. 
The proposed standard is justifiable on several grounds and of­
fers important advantages over the current state of the law. The 
first option calls for a repetition of the terms of the statutes with 
additional clarifying language explaining what a state statute must 
include in order to be sufficiently similar to a federal law to bar a 
citizen suit. The primary advantage offered by this additional lan­
guage is that it would remove any ambiguity as to when an action 
brought under a state law will bar a citizen suit under a federal law. 
The removal of this ambiguity itself would be a benefit to defend­
ants and plaintiffs alike because the mere existence of ambiguity 
introduces uncertainty into a complex and expensive process. 
It is therefore advanced that the citizen suit provisions of all 
federal environmental laws be amended to state that a citizen suit is 
barred by an action brought under a state law only if that law offers 
penalties substantially similar to those available under the closest 
analogous federal act (i.e., financial penalties within perhaps 10­
20% of the federal law), includes citizen participation as of right, 
and specifies whether attorneys' fees will be recoverable. 
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The second option similarly builds on existing case law. Op­
tion (2) would require Congress to amend the citizen suit provisions 
to state expressly that a suit is barred if the relevant regulatory 
agency and the violator have entered into a consent order which 
covers the same violations, includes mandatory deadlines for 
remediation, and imposes strict penalties for failure to meet those 
deadlines. In addition, the consent order process must have 
mandatory provisions for citizen participation as of right. 
The advantage of option (2) has been identified in those courts 
that have, in effect, already begun to employ it. As stated in North 
& South Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 
"[d]uplicative enforcement actions add little or nothing to compli­
ance actions already underway, but do divert State resources away 
from remedying violations in order to focus on the duplicative ef­
fort. "169 In other words, if a regulatory agency has resolved an is­
sue short of litigation by employing a consent order, the need for 
any action by regulators or private citizens is gone. As one court 
described it, "[t]o require an agency to commence any form of pro­
ceeding would be senseless where the agency has already succeeded 
in obtaining the respondent's agreement to comply with the law in 
some enforceable form."17o 
In addition to providing statutory support for the logical prop­
osition of barring citizen suits when a consent order has been 
achieved, option (2) also provides greater protection to citizen 
groups by requiring regulators to give private parties the right to 
participate, and prevents abuses such as were described in New 
York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York City Department of 
Sanitation,171 where a court roundly criticized a state agency for 
taking twelve years to rectify a problem while imposing only trivial 
fines and granting repeated time extensions. l72 
The third option, while apparently novel, simply provides a 
mechanism for recognizing the realities of modern environmental 
enforcement. As a general rule, a consent order is simply an agree­
ment between the regulator and regulated which is subsequently 
approved by a court. Naturally, courts have little involvement in 
169. See North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, 949 F.2d at 555-56. 
170. Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
171. 772 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
172. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. 
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preparing such orders and rarely add to, or subtract from, the terms 
thereof.173 
However, formal consent orders often take a considerable 
amount of time and effort to prepare. Thus, some government 
agencies prefer to use, whenever possible, memoranda of under­
standing. These agreements can be much quicker to implement and 
are still binding upon the parties. If such memoranda contain the 
same terms and conditions as a consent order, these memoranda 
can provide the same protection to the environment as a formal 
consent order. If the parties have finalized all the important details 
of an administrative' action, it should not matter precisely what 
form is used, so long as the form chosen provides the necessary 
protection to all parties, including the public, as described above. 
The consequence of accepting this suggested approach fits well 
with the purpose of citizen suits generally: namely, to allow private 
parties to act only if government is unwilling or unable to do so. 
Furthermore, it entirely preserves the right of individuals or organi­
zations interested in protecting the environment either to intercede 
in agency enforcement operations or to act on their own should the 
agency decide not to do so. It is true that this proposal presupposes 
that government can and will act decisively to protect the environ­
ment. But, as one court noted, "[t]he government, representing so­
ciety as a whole, is usually in the best position to vindicate societal 
rights and interests."174 The government is certainly in a better po­
sition to ensure the systematic application of a truly uniform na­
tional standard and prevent segmenting or balkanizing the 
enforcement of the nation's environmental laws. Primarily, how­
ever, it offers one standard that is consistent with the language of 
the statutes, the experience of administrative agencies, and the pur­
pose and intent of citizen suits generally. 
173. See United States v. Bliss, 133 F.R.D. 559, 568 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (providing 
that courts review consent orders for substantive fairness and reasonableness). 
174. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1318 (S.D. Iowa 
1997). 
